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1. Introduction 
 
The impetus for increasing the number of women on boards of directors is quickly gaining 
momentum across Europe and the world.  Already several European states have mandated 
female presence on boards through the imposition of quotas, while several other countries, 
such as the United States and Australia, have taken notice of the issue and are working to 
combat this problem through alternative means. 
 In the U.K., initiatives to increase female representation on board have been mainly 
directed at suggested targets and other non-mandatory recommendations.  In particular, in a 
government-backed report, Lord Davies of Abersoch recommended that FTSE 100 boards 
strive for at least 25 percent female representation on boards by 2015.1 Two years after the 
release of Lord Davies’ report, however, concerns remain. While the number of women on 
boards of FTSE 100 companies has increased, many boards still remain all-male and, at the 
current rate of progress, the goal of 25 percent is unlikely to be attained.2    
 The slow pace of change has not gone unnoticed.  The European Commission has 
recently released a series of recommendations aimed at quick changes in this area,3 while 
Lord Davies has charged that the slow rate of change is a result of managerial attitudes at 
                                                 
1 Lord Davies of Abersoch, Women on Boards – February 2011 (Department of Business Innovation and Skills, 
2011). 
2 Cranfield School of Management, The Female FTSE Board Report 2013: False Dawn of Progress for Women 
on Boards? (Cranfield University, 2013) 11, 13.   
3 European Commission, ‘Women on Boards: Commission proposes 40% objective’ (14 Nov 2012) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/gender-equality/news/121114_en.htm> accessed 2 October 2013. 
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some of Britain’s largest companies.  Labelling them “prehistoric monsters”, he has observed 
that these men “just don’t get equality”.4  
 Yet, despite the market’s apparent lack of interest in increasing the number of women 
on boards, the government continues to couch its initiatives in this area almost exclusively in 
economic based justifications.  It is perhaps no wonder then why managers fail to understand 
the equality issues underpinning the broader topic of women on boards when the main report 
recommending this change avoids these issues almost entirely. 
 Conversely, this article argues that rationales for increasing women on boards should 
be based on both equality and economics grounds. As Lord Davies’ comments have 
indicated, part of business’ slow take-up of his recommendations is due to a failure to 
understand the root causes of the lack of gender diversity on boards.  Without a greater 
understanding of the problem, and the issues that give rise to the status quo of fewer women 
on boards, it is not surprising that companies are wary of adopting the suggested solutions to 
a problem that they may not have understood or even been aware of.  Equality based 
rationales may therefore clarify the problem for businesses.  
 However, relying primarily on equality arguments to rationalise an initiative that 
promotes women on boards presents difficulties as well.  Boards of directors, are, after all, 
constituted to promote the success of the company for the benefit of shareholders.5 Their 
primary task is, accordingly, wealth maximization.6 Thus, as the very role and function of the 
board is economic in nature, increasing the number of women on boards must similarly be 
rationalised in economics.  
                                                 
4Louise Peacock, ‘Lord Davies shakes-up Britain's boardrooms’ The Telegraph (London, 18 Feb 2012) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.UK/finance/jobs/9090327/Lord-Davies-shakes-up-Britains-boardrooms.html> 
accessed 1 October 2013 
5 Companies Act 2006, s 172. 
6 Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for A Competitive Economy: The Strategic 
Framework (DTI 1999) para. 5.1.12 
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 At the same time, the most commonly relied upon economic justification for 
increasing the number of women on corporate boards – the relationship between women’s 
presence on boards and firm financial performance – does not necessarily support initiatives 
in this area. While some empirical studies have found a causal connection between female 
representation on boards and positive firm financial performance, others have not.7 Thus, the 
equivocal nature of the classic “business case” for increasing female representation on boards 
demands that a new rebolstered economic rationale be found.  
 One approach for a new economic rationale is to focus, not on the effects of female 
directors on financial performance, but on the contributions that female directors can make to 
the board decision-making process. Under this rationale, if women’s presence on boards 
makes boards more effective decision-makers, increasing the number of women on boards 
will be economically justified. 
 Accordingly, this article argues that initiatives to increase the number of women on 
boards should be rationalised both in terms of equality and in terms of the contributions 
women can make to the board decision-making process.  It makes this argument in three 
parts.  First, it begins by reviewing the government’s current efforts at addressing the lack of 
female representation on boards and examines the results of these efforts.  Given the 
shortcomings of the current efforts, it argues in favour of improving the rationales for the 
government’s recommendations as a means of prompting normative changes in companies.  
Second, it illustrates the content of the two new rationales by discussing both the need and 
                                                 
7 David A. Carter et al., ‘Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, and Firm Value’ (2003) 38:1 F. Rev. 33; 
Niclas L. Erhardt et al., ‘Board of Director Diversity and Firm Financial Performance’ (2003) 11 C.G. 102; 
Kathleen A. Farrell and Philip L. Hersch, ‘Additions to Corporate Boards: The Effect of Gender’, (2005) 11 J. 
of Corp. F. 85; Renee B. Adams and Daniel Ferreira, ‘Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact on 
Governance and Performance’ (2009) 94 J. of Financial Econ. 291, 292; David A. Matsa and Amalia R. Miller,’ 
A Female Style in Corporate Leadership? Evidence from Quotas’ (2013) 5(3) Amer. Econ. J.:  Applied Econ. 
136; Kenneth R. Ahern and Amy K. Dittmar, ‘The Changing of the Boards:  The Impact on Firm Valuation on 
Mandated Female Representation’ (2012) 127:1 Q. J. Econ. 137; Harald Dale-Olsen et al, ‘Women on Boards of 
Directors and Firm Performance’ in Frederik Engelstad and Mari Teigen (eds.), Firms, Boards and Gender 
Quotas: Comparative Perspectives (Emerald Group Publishing Ltd. 2012) 211; M. Schwartz-Ziv, ‘Does the 
Gender of Directors Matter?’, Edmond J. Safra Working Papers, No. 8 (March 2013) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2257867> accessed 1Oct 2013. 
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the particular benefits of an equality rationale, by drawing from Rawl’s theory of justice,  
before offering a reoriented economic rationale that focuses on women’s contributions to 
board effectiveness. Finally, it turns to examine methods by which gender diversity on boards 
can be fostered which align with the equality and the reoriented economic rationales 
discussed in the earlier section.  It concludes that while quotas do not necessarily accord with 
the earlier offered rationales, there are several other mechanisms that do.  
 
2. The Need to Bolster the Rationales for Women on Boards 
 
While the U.K. government has been diligent about efforts to increase women on boards, it 
has not been successful in effectuating substantial changes to the number of women on 
boards. As all of the government’s efforts in this area consist of suggestions or targets that are 
purely voluntary in nature, adoption of these initiatives is highly dependent on companies’ 
normative approach to inclusion of women in business.  For this reason, the government’s 
initiatives must be supported by new and bolstered rationales. 
 
A. Initiatives to Foster Women on Boards 
 
As early as 2003, Derek Higgs, in his review of non-executive directors, observed that the 
low number of female directors was “striking”.8  At the time, only six per cent of non-
executive board memberships were held by women, even though 30 percent of managers 
were female.9 Higgs recommended that in making appointments, future boards should draw 
from pools of qualified women.10 The Tyson Report, commissioned by the government 
following the publication of the Higgs Review, similarly advocated for broader approaches to 
                                                 
8 Derek Higgs, Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors (DTI 2003) para. 10.22. 
9 ibid para. 10.22 
10ibid para. 10.25 
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recruitment of non-executive directors as a means of attracting more female candidates to 
boards.11 
 More recently, the U.K. Corporate Governance Code expanded upon and codified 
Higgs’ recommendation.  In June 2010, the government introduced principles for corporate 
governance effectiveness, which, among other things, dealt with board appointments. The 
Code now provides that the search for board candidates should be conducted and 
appointments made with “due regard for the benefits of diversity on the board, including 
gender”.12 However, as the Code is structured on a “comply or explain” basis, companies 
need not adhere to this principle if they provide an explanation to their members for their 
reasons for doing so. 
 In 2010, the Coalition government also added gender diversity to boards as part of 
their mandate.  Specifically pledging “to promote gender equality on the boards of listed 
companies” in hopes of building “a fairer society”, the government appointed Lord Davies of 
Abersoch to head up an initiative to review the current status of female representation on 
boards and to make recommendations.13 
 The data revealed that efforts to bolster gender diversity on boards were sorely 
needed.  At the time of Lord Davies’ appointment, women represented only 12.5 percent of 
all FTSE 100 directors and 7.8 percent of FTSE 250 directors.14 In addition, 21 percent of 
FTSE 100 and 52.4 percent of FTSE 250 companies consisted of exclusively male boards, 
only 2 percent of chairs of FTSE 100 companies were women, and only 13.3 percent of new 
                                                 
11 Louise Tyson, The Tyson Report on the Recruitment and Development of Non-Executive Directors (London 
Business School 2003). 
12Financial Reporting Council, The U.K. Corporate Governance Code (2010), Principle B.2. 
13 Cabinet Office, The Coalition: Our Programme for Government (2010) 
<www.infrastruct.co.UK/downloads/govpr1.pdf/> accessed 1 October 2013; Lord Davies (n 1). 
14Lord Davies (n 1) 7. 
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appointments were made to women.15 At the same time, women in the basic labour force 
accounted for 45 percent.16 
 Based on these findings, Lord Davies made ten recommendations in a February 2011 
government-backed report.  Specifically, he recommended that FTSE 100 boards increase 
female board representation to at least 25 percent by 2015 by aiming to fill one-third of all 
new board appointments with women; that listed companies establish a policy on boardroom 
diversity, including measurable objectives for implementing the policy; that quoted 
companies disclose statistics on women in boards and in senior positions in their companies 
and disclose how diversity is germane to a board’s nominating process; and that companies 
consider women for board appointments whose experience is garnered outside the corporate 
mainstream.17 
 
B. The Effects of the Government Initiatives 
 
Two years after Lord Davies’ report was released, the Cranfield School of Management 
reviewed the effects of his recommendations.18  While their review indicated that some 
progress had been made, the data revealed that substantial changes to the inclusion of women 
on boards had not yet been achieved and that many companies were failing, in whole or in 
part, to adhere to the government’s initiatives.   
 The review found that the number of women on boards had increased to 17 percent on 
FTSE 100 companies and 13 percent on FTSE 250 companies. Nevertheless, six percent of 
FTSE 100 and just under 30 percent of FTSE 250 boards still remained exclusively male.19 
                                                 
15ibid 11 and 13. 
16ibid 9. 
17 ibid 18-22. 
18 Cranfield School of Management (n 2). 
19 ibid 11, 13, 37. 
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Moreover, only 25 percent – and not the Lord Davies recommended 33 percent – of all new 
appointments were made to women.20 
 A 2012 review further revealed that while increases in whole numbers were apparent, 
normative changes were less visible.21  For example, only 38 FTSE 100 and 34 FTSE 250 
companies set targets for the number of women they aim to have on their boards by 2015.22 
Moreover, 37 companies categorically stated that they would not be setting targets.23 Most 
companies also declined to disclose statistics about the number of women at every level of 
their organisation, to provide clear reporting arising out of their diversity policies, or to 
disclose whether they even have such a policy.24 
 Even more importantly, however, it is unclear whether the increases that have been 
made to gender diversity on boards are because companies suddenly – to use Lord Davies’ 
words – “get equality” or because of the increased media attention the issue has received.  If 
it is the latter – and the number of companies that have failed to prioritise diversity issues by 
setting targets or adopting diversity policies suggests that it is – then the momentum needed 
to achieve gender parity on boards over the next five years may not be achieved if media 
attention to this issue is diverted or if the threat of quotas, looming in the background, 
dissipates.   
 
C. Moving Away from Primarily an Economic Rationale 
 
The lack of normative changes to include gender diversity within company objectives 
suggests that despite small increases to the number of women on boards, the ability to 
                                                 
20ibid 20.  
21 Cranfield School of Management, Female FTSE Board Report 2012: Milestone or Millstone?  (Cranfield 
University 2012).   
22ibid 30, 44. 
23 ibid. 
24ibid 34, 46.  
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achieve lasting gender parity on boards of directors is at risk.  In part, this may be a result of 
the sole reliance on economic-based rationales offered to incentivise companies to take 
action.  However, economic rationales, standing alone, are unlikely to persuade companies to 
strive for gender diversity in the boardroom. 
 The reasons for this are three-fold. First, normative changes to corporate policies that 
effect substantive company behaviour are often not driven by economic rationales. 
Researchers have found that decision-making related to equity issues is not dependent on 
rational decisions25 and that ethical justifications can be the primary instigator of 
organizational change.26 Many companies embracing efforts to promote female candidates 
may be thus more likely to be prompted into action by moral or justness concerns.27 For 
instance, in supporting the women in boards initiative, Marcus Agius, Chairman of Barclays, 
specifically notes that “... prioritising gender balance in ...organisations... is the right thing to 
do.”28 
 Second, relying on economic rationales may have served to mask some of the 
problems propelling the issues surrounding gender diversity on boards. People involved in 
the selection of candidates have been found to be subject to unconscious or ingrained biases 
towards individuals of different genders.29 As these biases are unintentionally generated and 
may even contradict an individual’s philosophies and beliefs, individuals may not even be 
                                                 
25 Mike Noon, ‘The Fatal Flaws of Diversity and the Business Case for Ethnic Minorities’ (2007) 21:4 Work, 
Emp. and Soc’y 773, 779 (noting that decision-making on equity issues was largely made on an intuitive basis 
rather than through a cost-benefit analysis). 
26 Colin McLaughlin and Simon Deakin, ‘Equality Law and the Limits of the ‘Business Case’ For Addressing 
Gender Inequalities’(2011) University of Cambridge - Working Paper No. 420, 13 
<http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/WP420.pdf> accessed 2 October 2013. 
27 Siri Terjesen et al., ‘Women Directors on Corporate Boards: A Review and Research Agenda (2009) 17:3 
C.G. 320, 331; J.Cunyon Gordon, ‘Painting by Numbers: “And, Um, Let’s Have a Black Lawyer Sit at Our 
Table”’ (2003) 71 Fordham L. Rev. 1257, 1277. 
28Cranfield School of Management (n 21) 3. McLaughlin and Deakin similarly report that in their study they 
found that companies would seek more women at senior levels because it was the right thing to do. See 
McLaughlin and Deakin (n 26) 13. 
29Howard Ross, ‘Proven Strategies for Addressing Unconscious Bias in the Workplace’ (CDO Insights, Aug. 
2008) <http://www.cookross.com/docs/UnconsciousBias.pdf> accessed 1 October 2013; Nancy M. Carter and 
Christine Silva, ‘Women in Management: Delusions of Progress’ (2010) 88:3 Harv. Bus. Rev.19; Noon (n 25) 
779.  
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aware that they possess these biases.30 Commentators have speculated that such biases may 
be limiting efforts at increasing the number of women on boards.31 This is because director 
selection is heavily influenced by notions of trust or reliability which generally arise due to 
personal relationships.32  However, where a personal relationship is not present, similarities 
between the candidate and the selector, such as gender, become proxies for trust.  As a result 
an economic rationale, such as selecting the most trustworthy candidate, can enable the 
company to ignore or discount any evidence of an unconscious bias.  
 Finally, an economic rationale, on its own, may not be sufficient for effecting change 
in this area because the most common economic rationale used to justify gender diversity on 
boards is, in and of itself, unconvincing.  As indicated earlier, the studies demonstrating a 
correlation between gender diversity on boards and firm financial performance have been 
mixed. Several researchers have found that empirical evidence of this correlation is difficult 
to ascertain due to issues with data collection and difficulties with interpreting causation33 
while others have noted that identifying the true causal effects of women on boards is 
“methodologically challenging”.34 Still others have concluded that it is generally difficult to 
demonstrate a direct relationship between board composition and firm performance35 or to 
measure the benefits of gender diversity at all.36 Indeed, one group of researchers has even 
                                                 
30Anthony G. Greenwald and Linda H. Krieger, ‘Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations’ (2006) 94 CLR 945, 951. 
31Cheryl L. Wade, ‘Corporate Governance as Corporate Social Responsibility:  Empathy and Race 
Discrimination’ (2002) 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1461,1473; Carter and Silva (n 29); Thomas W. Joo, ‘A Trip Through 
the Maze of Corporate Democracy: Shareholder Voice and Management Composition’ (2003) 77 St. John’s L. 
Rev. 735, 742. 
32Rosabeth M. Kanter, Men and Women of the Corporation (Basic Books 1977) 48-49; J. Robert Brown, Jr, 
‘Neutralizing the Board of Directors and the Impact on Diversity’ (2011) Denver Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 11-18, 2-3 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1938427>  accessed 1 October 2013; Joo (n 
31) 742-744. 
33 Linda L. Broome and Kim D. Krawiec, ‘Signaling Through Board Diversity: Is Anyone Listening?’ (2008) 77 
U. Cin. L. Rev. 431, 433-434; Adams and Ferreira (n 7) 292; Caspar Rose, ‘Does Female Board Representation 
Influence Firm Performance? The Danish Evidence’ (2007) 15 C.G. 404, 412. 
34Dale-Olsen et al. (n 7) 227. 
35 See e.g. Dan R. Dalton et al., ‘Meta-Analytic Reviews of Board Composition, Leadership Structure, and 
Financial Performance’ (1998) 19 Strategic Management J. 269. 
36Noon (n 25) 777. 
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concluded that a relationship between these two variables may never be found.37 In any case, 
the almost exclusive reliance on economics in Lord Davies’ report has not prompted most 
British companies to make substantive changes to their practices. Consequently, as it turns 
out, an exclusive focus on economics to support gender diversity on boards is insufficient. 
 Instead, while acknowledging the importance of an economic rationale, this article 
argues that gender diversity on board initiatives should also be grounded in non-economic 
rationales as well.  To that end, the next section examines an equality rationale for these 
initiatives, and given the shortcoming of the dominant economic rationale, also devises a 
rebolstered economic rationale. 
 
3. New Rationales for Gender Diversity on Boards 
 
Although initiatives fostering gender diversity on boards in the U.K. have been mainly 
justified on economic grounds, there is some indication of the importance of non-economic 
rationales in this regard as well.  These have not been forgotten, but – standing in the shadow 
of the preferred economic rationale – severely downplayed.  The Coalition government, 
which appointed Lord Davies, for instance, pledged to promote gender equality on boards as 
a means of countering the many “barriers to equal opportunities in Britain”.38 Similarly, the 
House of Lords EU Select Committee noted that there is a “public interest in ensuring that 
opportunities are available to all, regardless of gender”.39  Even Lord Davies, who seems 
                                                 
37David A. Carter et al., ‘The Gender and Ethnic Diversity of US Boards and Board Committees and Firm 
Financial Performance’ (2010) 18 C.G. 396, 411.  Brown also argues that a relationship between firm value and 
diversity will not be found where the board exercises only a monitoring, and not an advisory, function.  See 
Brown (n 32) 21. 
38 Cabinet Office (n 13). 
39 House of Lords - European Union Committee, Women on Boards, 5th Report of Session 2012–13 (9 Nov 
2012) 13. 
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wary of non-economic rationales, admits that the issue is “as much about improving business 
performance as about promoting equal opportunities for women”.40 
 In truth, there are two rationales justifying gender diversity on boards:  equality and 
economics.  Under an equality rationale, gender diversity on boards is justified by the need to 
equalise power and opportunities between men and women; while under an economic 
rationale, gender diversity on boards is justified by the contributions women can make to 
companies.  That is, an equality rationale justifies initiatives promoting women on boards in 
terms of justice, while economic arguments are utilitarian in nature and treat issues of justice 
only indirectly.41 However, the two rationales need not remain distinct in that issues of justice 
may become utilitarian in nature as a signalling device or as a means of enhancing corporate 
reputation. 
 Nevertheless, while a utility rationale – even if it incorporates elements of justice – 
remains important for a business initiative such as gender diversity on boards, it is equally 
important to understand the issue in terms of equality as well. This is because it improves the 
theoretical soundness and grounding of the modes of reform, determines the scope and 
legitimacy of the actions needed to achieve gender equality, and determines the necessary 
level of participation by women.42 Most importantly though, an equality rationale promotes 
gender diversity on boards as a desired value in and of itself and it is this kind of value 
recognition that may prompt normative changes in businesses.  
 
A. Equality Rationale 
 
As understanding an initiative such as gender diversity on boards in terms of equality posits 
numerous benefits, it seems prudent to elaborate upon the precise nature of this rationale. 
                                                 
40Lord Davies (n 1) 7. 
41 Mari Teigen, ‘The Affirmative Action Controversy’ (2000) 8:2 NORA - Nordic J. of Fem. and Gender 63, 64. 
42 Kate Malleson, ‘Justifying Gender Equality on the Bench:  Why Different Won’t Do’ (2003) 11 Fem. L.S.1.   
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Justifying gender diversity on boards from an equality standpoint begins with a claim for an 
equal or balanced society – or, in other words − a society in which there is a just distribution 
of power and resources, participation and influence between men and women.  
 In fact, initiatives fostering gender diversity on boards are particularly well-directed 
towards redistributing power. Directorships, it must be recalled, are important sources of 
power and influence.  As a member of the Norwegian government recognised during the 
debate on whether quotas should be introduced for Norwegian boards: 
In a society where market forces might be said to be more important than ever 
before, it is even more important that women are well represented where the 
power is situated within the companies and the boards.43 
 
 Calls for an equal or balanced society may also be usefully premised on a Rawlsian 
framework of justice, or the agreed principles in a social contract by which rational persons 
would further their interests.44  Indeed, this view may be read so as to suggest that equality 
between genders would have been an agreed principle chosen behind a veil of ignorance.45 
For this reason, equality between genders can be viewed as an aspect of a just society.    
 Still, justifying gender initiatives on boards in terms of equality does not necessarily 
signify an apt redistribution of power and resources only when it results in parity 
representation of women.  Instead, an equality rationale, routed in notions of justice, simply 
contends that women must have the same opportunities as men to participate at leadership 
levels in business.46  
 Rawls’ second principle of justice underscores the importance of couching efforts to 
achieve justice in terms of promoting equal opportunities.  As he argued, offices and 
                                                 
43T. Giske, Member of Parliament as quoted in Hilde Bjørkhaug and Siri O. Sørensen, ‘Feminism without 
Gender? Arguments for Gender Quotas on Corporate Boards in Norway’ in Engelstad and Teigen (n 7) 198. 
44 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev’d ed. (Harvard University Press 1999) 4, 10. 
45 ibid 11. While Rawls did not consider gender in his work, he later argued in its favour. See John Rawls, 
Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Harvard University Press 2001) 66. 
46 Nancy Fraser, ‘Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition and Participation’ in 
Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth (eds.) Redistribution or Recognition? A Political Philosophical Exchange 
(Verso 2003)101; Malleson (n 42) 17. 
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positions should be available to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.47  That is, 
offices and positions should not only be “open in a formal sense”, but the chance to attain 
these positions should also be fair. 48  As Rawls explained, “those who are at the same level 
of talent and ability, and have the same willingness to use them, should have the same 
prospects of success.”49  He thus concluded: 
[F]ree market arrangements must be set within a framework of political and legal 
institutions which ... preserves the social conditions necessary for fair equality of 
opportunity”.50 
  
 While Rawls mainly focused on inequalities of opportunity relating to socio-economic 
class,51 his ideas can be equally extended to problems of gender-related inequalities of 
opportunity as well.  Indeed Rawls himself noted that his work would be “seriously 
defective” if it did not articulate the political values essential to justify the institutions needed 
to secure the equality of women.52   
 Applying Rawls’ second principle of justice, we see then that women on boards 
initiatives are justifiable in that they promote a more equal, and therefore just, society by 
seeking to correct gender-related inequalities of opportunity.  At the same time, however, 
applying Rawls’ work to existing women on boards initiatives also highlights their 
shortcomings. 
 Rawls argued that positions should not only be formally open to all, but that equally 
skilled, willing, and able individuals be given the same prospects of success by preserving the 
social conditions necessary for fair equality of opportunity. Conversely, while the 
government has ensured formal opportunities for women by prohibiting legal discrimination 
                                                 
47 Rawls (n 45) 42; Rawls (n 44) 53. 
48 Rawls (n 45) 63. 
49 ibid. 
50 ibid. 
51 Rawls did not consider sex-related differences in his work because he focused on ideal theory. Rawls (n 45) 
65. 
52 ibid 66. 
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on the basis of gender,53 it has not similarly ensured that the conditions necessary for 
women’s fair equality of opportunity have been preserved. 
 Indeed, the systematic under-representation of women at the board level is a signal 
that social and institutional arrangements – the conditions necessary to preserve fair equality 
of opportunity for women in business – are deficient.  In particular, the unequal division of 
family labour – requiring women to balance professional and domestic responsibilities54 – 
and an inflexible job model, which demands unfailing availability and a break-free linear 
career path,55 have both been found to affect women’s abilities to participate in senior 
business positions.56 Yet the government’s initiatives do not address either of these factors. 
 In fact, the need to ensure the social conditions necessary for fair equality of 
opportunity is one of the most important reasons for developing an equality rationale for 
initiatives to promote women on boards. By looking only to an economic rationale, the 
organizational and institutional changes needed to achieve greater representation of women 
on boards in a sustainable manner are likely to be overlooked.  Without such changes, 
increasing the number of women on boards will be achieved only in a limiting manner, in that 
the structural conditions that have impeded women’s fair equality of opportunity are unlikely 
to be addressed.  In other words, the government’s current initiatives may address the 
symptoms but not the root causes of a deeper problem. While it is understandable that rules 
amending board structure are not an appropriate vehicle for promoting social change, it is 
nevertheless crucial to develop a thorough understanding of the underlying issues of the 
                                                 
53 See Sex Discrimination Act 1975; Equality Act 2010. 
54 Georges Desvaux et al., Women Matter: Gender Diversity, A Corporate Performance Driver (McKinsey and 
Co., 2007) 10 <http://www.europeanpwn.net/files/mckinsey_2007_gender_matters.pdf> accessed 2 Oct 2013. 
55 Martin Kornberger et al., ‘Changing Gender Domination in a Big Four Accounting Firm: Flexibility, 
Performance and Client Service in Practice’ (2010) 35(8) Accounting, Organizations and Society 775, 788-89; 
Louise Ashley and Laura Empson, ‘Convenient Fictions and Inconvenient Truths: The Role Of Paradox In 
Understanding Female Career Progression Within Leading U.K. Accountancy Firms’(2012) Cass Centre for 
Professional Service Firms - Working Paper CPSF-008 
<http://www.cass.city.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/130133/working-paper-008.pdf> accessed 2 October 
2013. 
56 For a more in-depth discussion of these factors see Part 4(B)(ii)(b), below. 
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specific problem which are being addressed.  This is precisely what an equality rationale can 
provide. 
 Finally, an equality rationale also offers a distinctive advantage that an economic only 
rationale cannot offer.  Because equality is a “human right based in moral legitimacy”, it is an 
inalienable right.57 Thus, justifying initiatives that promote gender diversity on boards in 
equality is not dependent on women’s effects on firm financial performance.  That is, even if 
a correlation cannot be found between women on boards and shareholder maximization, an 
equality rationale still justifies measures to promote women on boards.  In this light, an 
equality rationale can be seen as emphasising women’s rights − as opposed to business 
reform − as the focus of the government’s measures. In short, increased female representation 
on boards is valued in its own right.  
 
B. A Rebolstered Economic Rationale 
 
While an equality rationale is perhaps the most important justification for initiatives 
promoting gender diversity on boards, economic rationales remain key supplements to the 
equality rationale.  In particular, economic rationales may be able to convince ardent sceptics 
or “convert power holders to the cause”.58 
 An economic rationale is in truth a utilitarian argument for measures that increase the 
number of women on boards. It is the use of or the consequences that women can bring that is 
underscored.59  For instance, the utility of increased representation of women is generally 
thought of in terms of resources and interests.60 Under a resource argument, women are 
                                                 
57Noon (n 25) 781. 
58 Marian Sawer, ‘Representation of women:  Questions of accountability’(2000) Paper for IPSA Conference, 2 
<http://ipsarc19.anu.edu.au/papers/Sawer.pdf> accessed 2 October 2013. 
59Teigen (n 41) 64. 
60 Bjørkhaug and Sørensen (n 43) 189; Helga M. Hernes, Welfare State And Woman Power: Essays In State 
Feminism (Norwegian University Press 1987), 22-25 
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thought to be able to contribute experience and competence not equally available from men, 
meaning that a failure to utilize women is thought of as wasting resources.61 Conversely, 
under an interest argument, women are thought of as representing (or better representing than 
men) women’s interests.62  
 Interestingly, Lord Davies’ report is almost wholly rationalized in terms of the classic 
utility arguments for increased representation of women.  Three of the arguments he puts 
forward for justifying his recommendations − improved performance, accessing the widest 
talent pool, and being more responsive to the market − discuss women’s contributions to 
boards in terms of their experience, perspective and interests.63 
 Yet despite the utilitarian rationales proffered in Lord Davies’ report, the report fails 
to detail concrete links between women’s contributions and benefits to companies.  For 
instance, the report notes that female directors enhance board independence and “ask the 
awkward questions more often”. From these contributions the report assumes better decision-
making and speculates that decision outcomes are “likely to be better”.64  However, it fails to 
show how board independence or asking awkward question actually improves decision-
making.  
 As the premise of the economic or utilitarian rationale is the consequences of 
women’s participation, it becomes imperative under this rationale to demonstrate the benefits 
women can bring to companies. Since benefits for firms usually mean wealth maximisation,65 
women’s contributions would ideally, under this rationale, be defined in terms of their effects 
on firm performance.  Nevertheless, despite countless studies examining this relationship, 
researchers have not been able to locate a consistent and robust relationship between these 
                                                 
61 See also Bjørkhaug and Sørensen (n 43) 189; Teigen (n 41) 66. 
62 Bjørkhaug and Sørensen (n 43) 189; Anne Phillips, The Politics of Presence (OUP, 1995). 
63Lord Davies (n 1) 8-10. 
64ibid 8. 
65Company Law Review Steering Group (n 6) para. 5.1.12. 
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two.66 As such relationships have been difficult to ascertain – and indeed may never be 
possible to definitively locate67 – another proxy for firm’s economic interests must be 
identified. One alternative is to focus on board effectiveness.  
 
i. Focus on Board Effectiveness 
 
The notion of board effectiveness draws from a rich line of literature stemming from strategic 
management theory.  Strategic management theorists argue that boards should not be seen as 
compositions of individuals, but rather as groups of decision-makers.  Consequently, 
examining the contributions of boards should focus, not on their demography, but rather on 
their processes or the way in which boards make their decisions. 
 In fact, strategic management theorists have found that demography does not have a 
direct relationship to firm performance, but rather influences firm performance in a complex 
and indirect manner.68 In part, this is because boards operate as episodic decision-makers, 
which are largely not involved in implementation. Instead, they find that the output produced 
by boards is mainly “cognitive in nature”.69 Scholars have therefore concluded that 
                                                 
66 Deborah L. Rhode and Amanda K. Packel, ‘Diversity on Corporate Boards: How Much Difference Does 
Difference Make?’ (2010) Rock Center for Corporate Governance, Stanford University – Working Paper No. 89 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1685615> accessed 2 October 2013 (surveying two dozen 
studies and concluding that a consistent positive or negative relationship between these two variables cannot be 
found).   
67 Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael S. Weisbach, ‘ Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined 
Institution: A Survey of Economic Literature’ (2003) Econ. Policy Rev. 1; Rose (n 33); Dale-Olsen et al. (n 7);  
Dalton et al. (n. 35).  
68Daniel P. Forbes and Frances J. Milliken, ‘Cognition and corporate governance: Understanding Boards of 
Directors as Strategic Decision Making Groups’ (1999) 24 Acad. of Management Rev. 489, 490.  As Zahra and 
Pearce argue, board attributes influence board roles. The effect of boards on company performance, however, is 
indirect. By performing their service and control roles, directors shape managerial strategic choices or actions 
resulting in strategic outcomes.  It is these strategic outcomes then, which affect financial performance.  See 
Shaker A. Zahra and John A. Pearce II, ‘Boards of Directors and Corporate Financial Performance: A Review 
and Integrative Model’ (1989) 15:2 J. of Management 291, 296-7. 
69Because boards are “responsible only for monitoring and influencing strategy—not for implementing strategic 
decisions or for day-to-day administration”, their role is cognitive: Forbes and Milliken (n 68) 492.  
18 
 
demographic variables of board members only directly influence how effectively boards 
perform their tasks, while a board’s overall effectiveness affects firm performance.70 
 Strategic management theory therefore suggests one reason why the relationship 
between gender diversity on boards and firm performance is mixed. As women’s 
contributions to firm performance are made through an intervening variable, board process, it 
becomes considerably more difficult to extract and measure their particular contribution to 
firm performance.71  Nevertheless, strategic management theory also provides a framework 
through which women’s contributions as directors can be assessed.  In short, if women 
positively contribute to the process by which boards make their decisions − which in turn 
makes the board more effective and increases firm performance − a rebolstered economic 
rationale for gender diversity on boards will have been found. 
 
ii. The Model for Effective Boards 
Before examining women’s contributions to board effectiveness, it is useful to examine the 
model of board effectiveness. Strategic management theorists posit that effective boards are a 
function of two criteria, which, in turn, are influenced by three board processes.  The two 
criteria are effective board task performance and the ability to work together in a cohesive 
manner.72 In turn, these criteria for effectiveness are influenced by three board processes: 
effort norms; cognitive conflict; and the board’s use of its knowledge and skills.73 Figure 1 
pictorial depicts this model. While strategic management theorists have departed from an 
                                                 
70 Board task performance directly affects firm performance, while board cohesiveness affects how well boards 
perform their tasks and therefore contributes indirectly to firm performance.  See Forbes and Milliken (n 68) 
492. 
71 Researchers argue that because of the multiple intervening processes between board structure and firm 
performance it is difficult to assess the precise relationship between the two.  Indeed, varying results of 
measurements of this relationship may be due to “methodological and conceptual issues, such as lack of 
attention to group dynamics, high complexity of processes, variations in measurements of board attributes and 
performance”.  See David Wan and C. H. Ong, ‘Board Structure, Process and Performance: Evidence from 
Public-listed Companies in Singapore’(2005) 13:2 C.G. 277, 278. 
72Forbes and Milliken (n 68) 492. 
73ibid.  See also Wan and Ong (n 71) 278. 
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analysis of demographic effects on firm performance, they are quick to point out that 
although the criteria for board effectiveness are distinct from firm performance, they both, 
directly or indirectly, contribute to firm performance.74  
 
 
Figure 1: Model of Board Effectiveness 
  
 The first criterion for an effective board is board task performance.  This represents 
the board’s effectiveness in the three broad functions of a board: service, management, and 
control.75  Service tasks are those services that the board can offer to top management such as 
providing access to networks or establishing contacts with the external environment and 
providing counsel and advice to executives.76 Management tasks include the exercise of 
managerial functions reserved to the board such as broad policy making, the hiring of top 
management, or the setting of executive pay.77  Finally, the most important task of boards is 
control, or the reduction of the agency costs perpetuated by management acting as agents of 
shareholders. Although control tasks broadly refer to the board’s monitoring of 
management’s activities, it can further be broken down into operational control, or the ex-
                                                 
74 Forbes and Milliken (n 68) 492. 
75 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis (OUP 2012) 44. 
76Bainbridge (n 75) 49; Zahra and Pearce (n 68) 292. 
77 Bainbridge (n 75) 46. 
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post monitoring of financial-oriented managerial decisions, and strategic control, or the ex-
ante control of management’s long term and qualitative oriented decisions.78 
 Second, board effectiveness is dependent on board cohesiveness.  This is the degree to 
which board members favour each other.  In short, the more cohesive the board, the more 
they are committed to the group.79 
  Strategic management theorists further argue that the effectiveness of boards is 
influenced by the processes through which they make their decisions.  Thus, effort norms, or 
the group’s shared belief regarding the level of effort each individual is expected to put 
toward a task, is one of the three recognised process factors that influence board task 
performance.80  Effort norms can have a significant influence on individual behaviour by 
encouraging each director to “do their homework” before meetings, to engage in firm-
specific diligent research, or even to ‘use pocket calculators’ during board meetings.81 
 Second, board effectiveness is influenced by cognitive conflict.82  This relates to 
disagreements about the content of the tasks being performed, including differences in 
viewpoints, ideas, and opinions.83 Cognitive conflict involves the use of critical and 
investigative interaction processes that can enhance the board’s performance of its control 
function and can result in the consideration of more alternatives and the more careful 
evaluation of alternatives.84 Multiple viewpoints, the exchange of positive and negative 
comments, and solution diversity are thought to enhance decision-making.85 
                                                 
78 Forbes and Milliken (n 68) 492; Sabina Nielsen and Morten Huse, ‘The Contribution of Women on Boards of 
Directors: Going beyond the Surface’ (2010) 18(2) C.G.136, 137.  
79 Irvin Summers et al. ‘Work-group Cohesion’ (1988) 63:2 Psychological Rep. 627; Stephen J. Zaccaro and 
Gregory H. Dobbins, ‘Contrasting Group and Organizational Commitment: Evidence For Differences Among 
Multilevel Attachments’ (1989) 10 J. of Org. Behavior 267, 271. 
80Ruth Wageman, ‘Interdependence and Group Effectiveness’ (1995) 40 Admin. Science Q. 145, 150; Forbes 
and Milliken (n 68) 492. 
81Forbes and Milliken (n 68) 494. 
82ibid 494. 
83 Karen A. Jehn, ‘A Multimethod Examination of the Benefits and Detriments of Intragroup Conflict’ (1995) 
40 Admin. Science Q. 256, 258. 
84 Forbes and Milliken (n 68) 494. 
85ibid. 
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 Finally, board effectiveness is influenced both by the degree of specialized knowledge 
and skills that boards possess and their ability to utilise their knowledge and skills and apply 
them to tasks.86  Effective boards are thus able to integrate individual expertise and apply 
them to firm specific issues. They will also elicit and respect each other’s expertise, build 
upon each other’s contributions and seek to combine their insights in creative, synergistic 
ways.87 
 Moreover, there is a relationship between the two criteria of board effectiveness.  
Since board task performance requires communication and deliberation, board members must 
exhibit a minimum level of interpersonal attraction, or cohesiveness, in order to engage in 
these actions.88  Cohesiveness also fosters trust of each other’s judgment and expertise and 
can enhance decision-making by promoting earlier and more extensive decision-making.89 
 At the same time, too much cohesiveness can lead to group think, wherein 
independent critical thinking is replaced by striving for unanimity among members, or a 
proliferation of excessive personal exchanges.90  Nevertheless, strategic management 
theorists have found that so long as cognitive conflict is present among members, even high 
levels of cohesiveness will not detract from the effectiveness of decision-making.91 
 
iii. Women’s Contributions to Effective Boards 
 
Having explored the key attributes of an effective board and its process, this section examines 
the contributions women have been found to make to each of the facets of board effectiveness 
                                                 
86ibid 495. 
87ibid 496. 
88ibid. 
89ibid. 
90 See generally Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and 
Fiascos. (Houghton-Mifflin, 1972). 
91 Forbes and Milliken (n 68) 496. 
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and the elements of board process. The discussion thus focuses on the role female directors 
play in each of the constitutive elements of board effectiveness.   
 The discussion begins by examining the contributions of female directors on process 
variables before turning to their impact on the criteria for board effectiveness.  In effect, it 
moves from a macro perspective on women’s influence on boards, by broadly examining how 
they contribute to process, before turning to a micro perspective by specifically looking at 
their impact on particular tasks. 
 Nevertheless, a word of caution must be offered:  women’s contributions explored in 
this section are generalizations drawn from robust empirical studies that have examined the 
actions or qualities of either women on boards or women in senior management positions. 
Consequently, any one woman may make only some or even none of these contributions.  
Still, the studies of women’s contributions are useful in making general assessments of 
women’s contributions to the board process. 
 
a) Women’s Contributions to Board Process 
 
Board process involves three attributes of boards: effort norms, cognitive conflict, and 
possession and use of knowledge and skills.  As the discussion will evidence, women make 
unique contributions to each of these process variables. 
 
(1) Effort Norms 
 
Effort norms are the expected standard of intensity that each board member will apply to 
task-performance behaviour.92 These norms dictate the expected level of preparation for and 
                                                 
92ibid. 
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participation in board meetings that each board member should exhibit.  Effective boards 
have been found, for instance, to have board members that review information essential for 
board decisions prior to meetings; to have meetings in which issues are discussed in sufficient 
depth, to document meetings by way of minutes, and to review the performance of the 
board.93  
 Studies have concluded that women contribute to effort norms in a number of ways.  
For instance, women have been found to bring higher expectations of board member 
responsibility due to their having surmounted additional hurdles in obtaining their position;94 
to spend more time preparing for board meetings, trying to understand the nature and logic of 
board work, and devoting time to board evaluation;95 and to have better attendance records 
for board meetings than men.96 In addition, the presence of women on boards improves the 
attendance behaviour of male counterparts and induces men’s preparation time for 
meetings.97  Studies have further shown that female directors have a significant positive 
effect on board development activities relating to board instructions and board evaluation,98 
and that women make boards more active.99  Women’s extensive preparation for board 
meetings has also enabled them to raise conflict-inducing or “tough” issues.100 
 
(2) Cognitive Conflict 
 
                                                 
93 Nielsen and Huse (n 78) 139. 
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Women have been found to make significant contributions to open discussions of task-related 
differences.  Studies have documented that female board members bring diverse viewpoints 
to the board room and encourage greater discussions and arguments over board decisions.101 
Women also favour a democratic and participative style of decision-making and are more 
prone to ask questions.102  Female directors have further been found to foster boardroom 
discussions because of their transformational leadership style which preferences 
collaboration, sharing of resources and flexibility.  This style tends to favour listening to 
other points of view and consideration of interests other than their own and can improve 
communication among directors and between board and management.103 At the same time, 
they are able to champion difficult or controversial issues that their male colleagues may 
avoid in board discussions,104 broaden discussions to better represent the concerns of a 
variety of stakeholders,105 and when they have divergent views, express and actively engage 
discussion of these views.106  Moreover, women’s contributions to board discussions tend to 
be based on facts and details − which they often demand − while men “tend to shoot from the 
hip”.107  Studies have also documented that women can contribute to the creativity or 
innovativeness of board discussions and of solutions considered in the board meetings.108   
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(3) Possession and Use of Knowledge and Skills 
 
A 2008 study of newly appointed directors of FTSE 100 firms in the U.K. has found that 
female directors are more likely to have MBA degrees, international experience and more 
experience as small firm board directors, although less CEO/COO experience, than their male 
counterparts.109  Female directors are also more likely to possess expert backgrounds outside 
of traditional business110 and have on average higher formal education than their male 
counterparts.111 In addition, female directors often possess unique skill sets not possessed by 
men.  For example, studies have documented women’s greater familiarity with consumer 
products112 or their greater empathy towards stakeholder issues.113  Women have further been 
found to possess greater influence over a community than men114 and may have a greater 
inclination to reduce risks.115  In addition, studies have shown that female directors who have 
worked their way up from male dominated cultures of senior management exhibit persistence 
and resilience or skills which enable them to champion difficult issues.116 
 Nevertheless, studies have also found that some women directors are reluctant to use 
their unique skill set, in part because they are consciously trying to avoid stereotypes.117  
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Thus, where women either do not possess different skills and knowledge from men, because 
their professional backgrounds are very similar or because they refrain from behaviour that 
differentiates them from their male colleagues, women’s contributions to board effectiveness 
may be limited. At the same time, having a critical mass of women118 or having a balanced 
board119 often reduces these types of problems.120 
 
b) Women’s Impact on Board Effectiveness Criteria 
Having explored women’s contributions to board process, this section examines women’s 
specific contributions to board tasks and cohesiveness.  
 
(1) Board Tasks 
As mentioned previously, board tasks can be broadly divided into service, management, and 
control tasks. However, carrying out control tasks is widely thought to be the most important 
function of boards, and these tasks can be further broken down into strategic control and 
operational control tasks.121  Strategic tasks usually refer to those that pertain to the board’s 
own initiatives in developing a firm.  This can include decision-making related to major 
resource allocation and assessments of resources, products, and markets. Strategic tasks may 
also relate to decision-making pertaining to corporate social responsibility and stakeholder 
expectations.122 
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 Studies have documented that women generally exert a positive impact on these types 
of tasks, particularly tasks of a qualitative nature.123 For instance, women’s leadership style, 
which involves being inclusive and sharing power and information with colleagues, has been 
found to foster strategy development.124 They have also been found to contribute to corporate 
social responsibility related issues and their improvement.  Thus, research demonstrates a 
positive correlation between the number of female directors or the percentage of women on 
the board and a company’s dedication to corporate social responsibility initiatives.125 
 Conversely, operational tasks generally pertain to financial control of the business and 
may include behaviour control such as evaluations of the performance and compensation of 
the CEO and top management team. In this area, women have been found to be highly 
effective monitors of management.126 It is surmised that this is a result of women’s broader 
range of professional experience and inclination to possess advanced degrees.  Moreover, this 
may be because women, if appointed to boards, are more likely to be appointed to audit, 
nominating and corporate governance committees.127 In fact, Adams and Ferreira conclude 
that female directors, overall, are tougher monitors than their male counterparts.  Their 
research finds that boards with more female directors are more likely to hold CEOs 
accountable for poor stock performance,128 suggesting that female directors on boards are 
more likely to correlate with higher CEO turnover. At the same time, they find that this 
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toughness in monitoring can lead to overmonitoring for already well-governed firms, but be 
beneficial to firms with weak governance.129 
 Interestingly, female directors appear to have no impact on CEO compensation.  One 
reason for this is because they are less likely to be appointed to compensation committees.130 
However, commentators have also posited that board members who are demographically 
similar to CEOs are more likely to support them and accordingly award them higher 
compensation.131 Under this rationale, then, increased female representation on boards may 
have an effect on lowering CEO compensation. 
 
(2) Cohesiveness 
Finally, as board effectiveness is in part dependent on cohesiveness, women’s contribution to 
this factor must also be considered. Studies have found that demographic diversity in groups 
in many cases can lead to conflict.132  This is not the aforementioned – and desirable – 
cognitive conflict, or disagreement about the task at hand, but rather relational conflict – 
personal disagreements – which can detract from the cohesiveness of the board.  However, 
because of evidence of women’s participative leadership behaviour and greater sensitivity 
towards others, they may be more inclined to be accepting of other people’s positions. 
Indeed, one study of female directors in Norway has found that the ratio of women directors 
is negatively associated with board conflict, suggesting that women’s presence on the board 
is not disruptive but can, in fact, contribute to cohesiveness.133 
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 Nevertheless, there is some risk that female directors may be too accommodating of 
the ideas of other board members or unable to present and bring in their alternative 
knowledge and experience which would give rise to relational conflict.134  While these 
attributes help foster board cohesiveness, they can detract from increased cognitive conflict.  
Thus, in order to capture the unique contributions of female directors, women must be able to 
assert their idiosyncratic knowledge and experience, which fosters cognitive conflict, without 
allowing these idiosyncrasies from becoming the source of relational conflicts.  However, the 
need for female directors’ to balance these competing aims is lessened if the remaining board 
members are also open to multiple viewpoints and opinions.135 
 
iv. The Rebolstered Economic Rationale 
 
Examining women’s contributions to board effectiveness thus reveals that women can make 
several unique benefits to board operations, which positively affects firm performance.  They 
can improve board development work, incentivise preparation for and attendance at meetings 
and generally improve overall board activity.  In addition, they can proffer unique and 
different perspectives and/or alternate knowledge and skill sets that can diversify board 
discussions and the decisions taken.  These contributions to the process of board decision-
making can, in turn, result in superior performance of qualitative board tasks, monitoring of 
management, strategy development and engagement in stakeholder issues.  Women’s 
presence can also make boards more cohesive groups which can improve board commitment 
to the business and improve their overall decision-making. 
 At the same time, companies may not need all of women’s unique contributions to 
board decision-making. Thus, firms that do not require strengths in areas where women have 
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been found to make particular contributions to boards, such as qualitative decision-making or 
monitoring, may not necessarily be able to translate every contribution of women to board-
decision making into improved firm performance.  In other words, some of the contributions 
of women to boards may be firm specific. Moreover, examining women’s contributions to 
board effectiveness reveals that simply placing a woman on a board does not automatically 
translate into the contributions women have been known to make to boards. Women whose 
backgrounds are very similar to their male contemporaries, those that easily conform to the 
ideas espoused by other board members, or those that are unable to present and use their 
alternate views, experience or knowledge may not make unique contributions to board 
decision-making.   
 At first glance, the failure to demonstrate that every contribution of any woman 
appointed to a board will improve decision-making may suggest that an economic rationale 
for women on boards, underpinned by board effectiveness, is not as unequivocal as the 
traditional “business case” for gender diversity on boards.  However, board effectiveness as 
the measure of women’s contributions to boards offers two advantages.  First, it demonstrates 
that women as a group make several distinct contributions to board effectiveness, including 
improving overall board activity, representing women’s interests, and increasing board 
cohesiveness, all of which, in turn, improves firm performance. Thus, generally speaking, 
focusing on board effectiveness demonstrates that women, unequivocally, improve firm 
performance, albeit indirectly. In other words, women’s contributions to board effectiveness 
generally evidence the economic rationale for increasing women on boards. 
 Second, focusing on board effectiveness reveals both the specific advantages and 
disadvantages that women can make to boards.  Implicit in this recognition is that any 
demographic variable, including male, white and fifty-something - the typical characteristics 
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of directors 136– likely offer some advantages and some disadvantages to board decision-
making. Indeed, the research on women’s contributions to boards has already highlighted 
some of male directors’ shortcomings despite men not being the focus of the research. 
Focusing on board effectiveness therefore highlights the importance of having roughly 
balanced boards of men and women in order to ensure that gender-specific disadvantages that 
directors can make to the board decision-making process will be offset. 
 
4. Increasing Women on Boards: The Way Forward 
 
Given both the equality and economic justifications for increasing the number of women on 
boards, the next step is to examine how best to effect this aim.  A common approach to 
fostering women on boards has become to impose gender quotas.  While several countries 
have already adopted this approach, Norway was the first to do so and has been one of the 
most successful models for use of the quota system. 
 The U.K. government has, until now, eschewed quotas.  Instead it has generally 
supported companies’ self-regulation in the area.  Nonetheless, the threat of quotas persists in 
this area as both the U.K. government and the European Commission have indicated an 
interest in imposing quotas if efforts to self-regulate do not effect substantive changes.137 In 
determining the best way forward for fostering women on boards it thus becomes necessary 
to engage directly with the use of quotas. 
 The next sections examine first, the merits of quotas, before turning to examine 
whether quotas would be a suitable tool for effecting change in this area in the U.K.  Second, 
this part moves to discuss alternative approaches for fostering women on boards by 
examining the issue from both a supply and a demand perspective.   
                                                 
136Mairi Maclean and Charles Harvey, ‘Women on Corporate Boards of Directors:  The French Perspective’ in 
Vinnicombe et al. (n 100) 47. 
137 See e.g., Lord Davies (n 1) 2; European Commission (n 3). 
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A. Quotas 
 
Given that the U.K.’s government’s self-regulatory approach to increasing the number of 
women on boards has struggled to make substantive changes, the most likely solution to 
effect a more rapid change would be for the government to impose regulations prescribing 
quotas.  Already, several European countries have adopted this approach, although with 
varying levels of success.  Interestingly countries, such as Spain, that have not accompanied 
their quota requirements with vigilant sanctions for non-compliance have not achieved 
greater levels of success than self-regulatory approaches.138  Nevertheless, Norway, which 
imposed both strict requirements for a 40 percent quota for female representation on boards 
and stringent sanctions for non-compliance,139 has within a short amount of time achieved 
unparalleled success with its initiative.  
 As the first state to impose quotas for gender diversity on boards, Norway has become 
an example of the benefits that quotas can offer. No other state can offer comparable 
information, either due to the recency of their efforts or the incomplete nature of their plan, 
on the advantages of a quota system. For this reason, in assessing the value of quotas for the 
U.K., it becomes prudent to examine Norway’s approach to see if its system of quotas could 
be transferable to the U.K. 
 However, some important differences between Norway and the U.K. suggest that the 
effectiveness of the quota system in Norway will likely not be able to be replicated in the 
U.K. For example, gender equality is the prevailing norm in Norway.  Indeed, the need to 
bolster its already prominent international reputation for gender equality was one of the 
                                                 
138 In 2009, women represented only 9 percent on boards despite a 40 percent quota requirement. See Isabel 
Huerta Viesca, ‘Women on the boards of major Spanish corporations after the entry into force of the Organic 
Equality Law 3/2007’ (2010) Co. Law. 219. 
139 Forced dissolution is the ultimate penalty for being in breach of the quota laws.  See Mari Teigen, ‘Gender 
Quotas on Corporate Boards’ in Engelstad and Teigen (n 7) 124. 
33 
 
reasons the quota laws were introduced in the first place.140 Norwegian political tradition has 
similarly emphasized gender equality, although mainly in the public sector, through measures 
designed to encourage female employment or to promote work-family reconciliation.  
Consequently, societal consensus on the importance of gender equality made it much easier 
for companies to accept and adhere to the quota.  Conversely, gender equality as an ideal 
does not enjoy comparable importance in the U.K. as it does in Norway.141  
 Second, related to the importance of gender equality as a norm in Norwegian society, 
Norway has a tradition of achieving gender equality by way of quotas.  Norwegian political 
parties have widely used gender quotas since 1974 and since 1981 all public boards, panels 
and committees require equal representation of both genders.142 In fact, most of the other 
states that have adopted a quota system have a system of using quotas to improve gender 
parity in their political systems.143 In comparison, the U.K. does not employ a quota system 
for political representation. While both Labour and the Liberal Democrats employ voluntary 
party quotas, election of political members is not determined through the use of quotas.  
Thus, the road for quotas in the economy in the U.K. is considerably longer and thornier than 
in Norway. 
 Third, Norway’s quota requirements apply only to public limited companies, state- 
and municipality-owned companies and cooperative companies.  Thus, only 400 public 
companies are subject to the quota requirements while the 160,000 private companies are 
not.144 In addition, almost 40 percent of the public companies are dominated by state 
ownership, meaning that the state was always able to influence the composition of the board 
                                                 
140 ibid 122; Bjørkhaug and Sørensen (n 43) 197. 
141 Nicole M. Fortin, ‘Gender Role Attitudes and the Labour-market Outcomes of Women across OECD 
Countries’ (2005) 21(3) Oxford Rev. of Econ. Policy 416; Centre for Women & Democracy, ‘Sex and Power 
2013: Who runs Britain?’ (Centre for Women and Democracy, 2013) < http://www.fawcettsociety.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2013/02/Sex-and-Power-2013-FINAL-REPORT.pdf> accessed 2 October 2013. 
142 Vibeke Heidenreichat, ‘Why Gender Quotas in Company Boards in Norway – and Not in Sweden?’ in 
Engelstad and Teigen (n 7) 154,155; Drude Dahlerup, Women, Quotas and Politics (Routledge 2006). 
143 Teigen (n 139) 127-130. 
144 ibid 123 
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in any case.145 A comparable law in the U.K. would reach over 10,000 companies, most of 
which are not dominated by state-ownership, suggesting the much broader reach of 
comparable legislation in the U.K. than in Norway.146 
 Finally, the success of Norway’s initiative is due in part to the stringent sanctions for 
non-compliance that accompany the quota requirements.  Although, companies are warned 
initially of non-compliance, and then threatened with fines, the ultimate consequence of 
failing to adhere to the law is forced dissolution.147 In fact, several companies re-registered as 
private companies when they failed to adhere to the quota requirements and were threatened 
with forced dissolution.148 Conversely, failing to adhere to the requirements of appointing 
directors under the U.K. Companies Act leads only to a fine.149  It is therefore unlikely that a 
quota law in the U.K. will contain sanctions for non-compliance that are stringent enough to 
induce the same level of compliance as in Norway. 
 Given the fundamental differences between Norway and U.K., it is unlikely that 
Norway’s success with quotas could be replicated in the U.K.  More likely, mandatory quotas 
would be met with widespread criticism from businesses150 in addition to attempts to evade 
the applicability of the law.  The latter could include refusals to adhere to the quota if the 
sanctions for non-compliance are not strict enough, re-registering as a private company if the 
rules apply only to public companies, delisting from the relevant stock exchange(s) if the 
rules pertain only to listed companies, or in extreme situations, incorporating in jurisdictions 
without quota requirements. 
                                                 
145 Engelstad (n 111) 254. 
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 Moreover, in addition to the differences between the two states, studies examining the 
effects of Norway’s gender quotas for boards suggest substantive shortcomings of the 
legislation itself as well. For example, one study has found that the percentage of women on 
boards has neither increased above the prescribed amount nor has the number of female 
chairs increased.151 Instead, the study found that the number of women holding multiple 
directorships has increased.  Dubbed the “golden skirts”, this small, but select group of 
women have, as a result of the quota requirements, become a concentrated, powerful and elite 
group.152  Although the authors of the study caution against findings of causality, their 
research indicates that the quota requirements, even in gender equality friendly Norway, have 
not made substantive normative changes on this issue.  In fact, the problems arising out of the 
use of quotas is indicative of those foreshadowed by a Norwegian director: 
Quotas are an effective tool if you only focus on...statistics...[T]o get more talented 
female...board candidates, it’s all about changing attitudes.  This requires long-term 
efforts.153 
The next section, consequently, canvasses alternatives to quotas that the U.K. should 
consider. 
 
B. Alternatives to Quotas 
 
Given the government’s preference for a voluntary approach and as quotas remain 
problematic in and of themselves, two alternatives to quotas are suggested.  The first 
alternative looks at the issue from a demand perspective by examining methods by which the 
                                                 
151Cathrine Seierstad and Tore Opsahl, ‘For the few not the many? The effects of affirmative action on presence, 
prominence, and social capital of women directors in Norway’ (2011) 27(1) Scandinavian J. of Management 44, 
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demand for women as board members can be increased.  Drawing from the practices of the 
American National Football League (“NFL”), it discusses a system through which the NFL 
increased the number of minority head coaches.   The second alternative turns to look at the 
issue from a supply perspective and discusses both a proposed database for tracking qualified 
women as well as necessary support mechanisms.  
 
i. Increasing Demand: Lessons from American Football 
 
a) The Rooney Rule 
 
In 2002, the NFL noticed that although a significant percentage of African-Americans were 
professional football players, less than six percent of NFL teams were coached by African-
Americans.  Determined to increase the number of minority coaches, the NFL introduced a 
series of recommendations designed to promote diversity in the league.154 Included in these 
recommendations was a rule which mandated that teams seeking to hire a head coach 
interview one or more minority applicants for the position.  After the recommendations were 
implemented, the rule became known as the “Rooney Rule” after Dan Rooney, owner of one 
of the teams and chair of the committee making the recommendations.155  The Rooney Rule 
is thought to have increased the number of minority head coaches from 6 to 22 percent in 
three years.156 
                                                 
154National Football League, ‘NFL Clubs to Implement Comprehensive Program to Promote Diversity in 
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 Pursuant to the Rooney Rule, the NFL also issued a series of guidelines for 
interviewing head coaches.  Among the suggested practices, teams are required to clearly and 
fully define the role of the coach and the qualities needed for the position, set forth a timeline 
for the search process including key decisions and dates, and identify a deep and diverse pool 
of candidates using a variety of criteria for diversity.157 In relation to identifying diverse 
candidates, the NFL guidelines further provide that teams should be knowledgeable about 
both internal and external minority candidates.158 Moreover, failure to adhere to the Rooney 
Rule’s requirements is punishable by a fine for the team and personal liability for the 
executives involved.159 
 
b) A Rooney Rule for Boards 
 
The premise of the Rooney Rule seems equally applicable to the appointment of women to 
boards.  Instead of imposing quotas, legislation could be introduced that mandates that board 
nominating committees interview at least one female candidate for every board opening.  In 
addition, similar to the guidelines under the Rooney Rule, board nominating committees 
could be required to define the role and qualities of directors and seek out a pool of 
candidates using a variety of criteria for diversity, one of which must be gender.  Moreover, 
the legislation could be extended to executive search firms, who are commonly involved in 
board appointments processes, such that the firms would be required to supply at least one 
female candidate for every three male candidates they recommend.  
 Enforcement of the rule would likely be by way of two routes.  First, either executive 
search firms or members of the nominating committee themselves could notify the authorities 
if a firm fails to interview a female candidate.  Second, firms with a low representation of 
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female members on the board could be required to submit to yearly audits in which they 
would have to evidence their practices for recruiting women to the board, including 
information on the number of women interviewed, summaries of the interviewed women’s 
qualifications, and reasons for not hiring the women interviewed.  Moreover, sanctions for 
failing to adhere to these practices could be similar to those imposed under the Rooney Rule 
where the team and the team’s owner have both been fined.160 Similarly, for companies that 
fail to interview women for board positions, both the firm and the CEO or managing director 
could be fined. 
 A Rooney Rule for boards boasts a number of different advantages over the use of 
quotas. First, as it is directed at improving equality of opportunity but does not mandate a 
required result, it may be perceived by businesses and boards as a more just solution than 
quotas. While quotas mandate explicit hiring preferences, the Rooney Rule only sets aside 
interviews for minorities.  Thus, the minority candidate does not gain an advantage when it 
comes to the final selection, but must, instead, compete with all the other qualified applicants 
for the position.161  
 In this way, the Rooney Rule is aimed only at levelling the playing field or providing 
for a more just basis for fair competition.  This still enables the best candidate – male or 
female – to rise to the top.  It is thus not akin or proximate to a legislative quota which would 
guarantee the appointment of a woman as the gender of the ultimately selected director is not 
prescribed.162 Indeed, nominating committees can continue to appoint directors on the basis 
of qualifications rather than gender.  
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 Second, because, unlike quotas, a Rooney Rule for boards emphasises the individual 
skills and attributes of a female candidate instead of her gender, boards are less likely to view 
women as a demographic statistic.  Women appointed to boards are therefore more likely to 
be viewed as equals and to be accepted by board members.  As the rebolstered economic 
rationale argued above indicates, acceptance by and viewing of women as equals by other 
board members both increases board cohesiveness and enables women’s contributions to 
board discussions to be valued by board members.163 Conversely, quotas may put appointed 
women in hostile environments in which the other board members view her as primarily a 
“quota-filling member” rather than an individual appointed on merit.164 At the same time, a 
woman appointed under a Rooney Rule will also view her appointment as being one achieved 
on merit.  This may instil greater confidence in her, making her more likely to exercise 
influence over board dynamics. 
 Third, use of the Rooney Rule may enable nominating committees to circumvent the 
problems of unconscious bias that arise during the selection process previously discussed.165 
While similarities between the selector and the candidate may still initially dominate as 
proxies of trust, by being exposed to qualified women, the selectors may gradually be able to 
identify other non-biased factors for trust, enabling them to appoint a wider variety of 
individuals to boards rather than those that act, look and sound like them. 
 Finally, a Rooney Rule for boards is also more likely to bring about a normative shift 
regarding the value of women as board members than under a quota system. If those who are 
resistant to the notion of women on boards are required to consider qualified women for 
board positions, it is more likely that they will see the merits that women can offer. It is thus, 
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an exercise, far and above, one of box-ticking.166 Indeed, over time, it is more likely to 
prompt an attitudinal shift than a self-regulatory or voluntary approach. 
 
ii. Increasing Supply 
 
In addition to introducing the Rooney Rule to increase the demand for minority head coaches, 
the NFL introduced a new program to create a supply of qualified individuals.  This came in 
the form of a coaching fellowship program designed to prepare individuals to take on the 
responsibilities of a head coaching position.167 Increasing the demand for women on boards 
through use of a Rooney Rule styled initiative must, similarly, be complemented by 
initiatives that promote the supply of qualified women for these positions.168 
a) Creating a Database 
In part, adopting a Rooney Rule for boards may, in and of itself, address the supply problem.  
If companies are mandated to interview female candidates, there may be more impetus to 
home groom women who could later help companies meet this requirement.  For example, 
National Grid plc has already adopted its own variant of a Rooney Rule by having a policy in 
place that provides that a third of the candidates put forward for mid-level management 
positions must be female.169  Nevertheless, for those companies that are more resistant to 
change − in addition to board mentorship and training programs already advocated in Lord 
Davies’ report – further measures may be necessary to ensure a steady stream of qualified 
women. 
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 One option would be to implement a nation-wide database that houses the information 
of qualified female board candidates. Private organisations in both the United States and 
Norway have already compiled databases in which women interested in board positions can 
voluntarily submit their details170 as has London-based “High Tech Women” and the 
Cranfield School of Management.171 The Tyson report, has, however, previously rejected the 
use of databases. The Report cited concerns about the growing number of databases and 
pointed to a poor experience with a public sector database, used in the past, whose organiser 
became increasingly involved with commercial activities.172 
 Yet, a centralised government-run database may, despite the Tyson report’s critiques, 
still offer a number of advantages.  First, unlike the privately run databases, a government 
database would centralise the information of all aspiring female board candidates.  Thus, 
firms would be able to have one source from which they could locate female candidates, 
thereby minimising their transaction costs. In fact, the database could be funded by imposing 
a yearly maintenance fee on firms, while female candidates could voluntarily register their 
information for free.173   
 Second, women in the so-called ‘pipeline’ − those in upper level and senior 
management positions − could be encouraged to register with the database in order to monitor 
the progression of women to boards.  By centralising the information, moreover, women at 
each level of the progression of women to boards could be monitored.  Consequently if 
deficiencies were then identified at any level, government initiatives specifically targeted at 
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that level could be strengthened. Finally, the mandate of the host of the database could be 
restricted to simply organising and monitoring the information on the database and prohibited 
from engaging in commercial activities.  This limited mandate would eliminate the problem 
that arose with the previously used public sector database. 
 
b) Social and Institutional Measures 
While a database of qualified candidates may descriptively demonstrate the supply of women 
that are available, to truly ensure a supply of qualified women, gender parity initiatives must 
be complemented by supplementary measures that address the factors which have 
traditionally limited women’s participation in business.174 As the equality rationale, discussed 
previously, reveals, women’s fair equality of opportunity to participate in business may be 
limited by existing social and institutional arrangements. 
 There are principally two main factors that limit women’s opportunities to participate 
in business at a leadership level. The first is women’s double burden, or the combination of 
work and domestic responsibilities.175 As primary responsibility for family life still tends to 
rest on women, women are required to fulfil work responsibilities in addition to domestic 
responsibilities such as child care, house work, care of the elderly, etc.  The ‘double burden’ 
is thus incompatible for many women with the demands associated with positions of 
leadership in business. 
 The second factor is the job model for success.  Positions of leadership in business 
tend to be achieved through a model in which unfailing availability and total geographical 
mobility at all times is required in addition to a linear career path with no breaks.176 This 
model prizes career before family life, thereby penalising women who take breaks such as 
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maternity leave.177  Moreover, women who achieve success by following this model may also 
pay a much higher price than men. Thus, while men in positions of leadership are likely to be 
married and to have children, more than half of women in positions of leadership do not have 
children and one third of them are unmarried.178 
 Curiously, although companies have found that they have been unable to retain 
women at senior levels because of the inflexibility of this job model, there have been few 
attempts to change it.  Instead, attempts to increase the progression of women in business at 
senior levels have focused on encouraging women to embrace the current job model.179  Yet 
because the existing job model has contributed to problems with equality in the first place, 
attempts to eradicate inequalities in this way have resulted in paradoxical outcomes.180   
 Based on these identified limitations to women’s participation in business, achieving a 
sustainable supply of qualified women for boards requires changes both to support systems as 
well as a reconfiguration of the model for success.  Thus, changes must be made to alleviate 
women’s double burden.  This should include, as a starting point, better access to affordable 
child care, as limitations on child care facilities have been found to limit women’s 
participation in the labour force.181  Government measures should accordingly be directed at 
either creating additional child care facilities or lowering the costs of existing facilities as 
well as policies which help families share child care, such as improved paternity leave. 
 In addition, the model of success must also be revised.  Amending the existing job 
model to facilitate flexible working conditions such as flexibility in terms of time and place is 
essential to promoting women into senior positions in business.  Indeed, since the current job 
model for success has contributed to the inability of firms to retain women at senior levels in 
                                                 
177Desvaux et al. (n 54) 8. 
178ibid 16. 
179 ibid 14-15; Kornberger et al. (n 55); Ashley and Empson (n 55). 
180 Ashley and Empson (n 55). 
181 Arnaud Chevalier and Tarja K. Viitanen, ‘The Causality Between Female Labour Force Participation and the 
Availability of Childcare’ (2002) 9 Applied Econ. Letters 915; Karen O. Mason and Karen Kuhlthau, ‘The 
Perceived Impact of Child Care Costs on Women’s Labour Supply and Fertility’(1992) 29 Demography 523. 
44 
 
business, failing to revise the model will ensure that there will continue to be deficiencies in 
the supply of qualified women. 
 As the equality rationale, earlier posited, highlights, without structural changes to the 
mechanisms that gave rise to the under-representation of women at higher levels of business 
in the first place, initiatives to increase the number of women on boards are not sustainable.  
Only by changing the social and institutional arrangements that may have compromised 
women’s participation in the labour market will measures to increase women on boards be 
more than mere window dressing. For this reason, if the government is truly committed to 
having gender diverse boards, it is insufficient for them to place the onus only on companies 
to make changes at the board level. While companies can play a pivotal role in this arena, it is 
the state which retains key responsibility for breaking down structural barriers in the labour 
market and facilitating women’s participation in it. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
Measures to increase the number of women on boards have been described as both the ‘right’ 
thing and the ‘bright’ thing.182 In truth, rationales justifying measures in this area should only 
have to demonstrate how they promote the ‘right’ thing, or in other words, be entirely 
justified in terms of equality and justice.  It is only because the support of the business 
community is essential to effect change in this area that demonstrating the economic benefits 
of having women on the boards remains an important − albeit secondary − rationale.  
 Recognizing the hierarchy of rationales justifying reforms in this area further 
demonstrates the problems with relying on the government’s preference for an exclusive 
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business-led approach.  Promoting equality is unlikely to be a motivating factor for 
companies to make the normative changes that will result in increasing the number of female 
directorships in the long run.  Thus, the recent increases that have been made to the number 
of women on boards are unlikely to be sustainable in the long run. 
 Instead, because considerations of equality are the predominant reason for instituting 
measures in this arena, the government must play an important role in this area alongside 
business. While the predominant free-market ideology espoused by the market would likely 
abhor severe governmental intervention, it is more likely to accept government efforts which 
facilitate companies’ work in this area.  For this reason, measures such as promulgating a 
Rooney rule for boards, creating a database of qualified women and breaking down 
institutional and social barriers to better ensure women’s fair equality of opportunity to 
participate in business are limited means by which the government could assist companies’ 
work in this area.   
 While a business-led approach has made some short-term improvements to board 
composition, it has not resulted in the substantive normative changes needed to produce a 
sustainable solution to the problem.  It is therefore time for the government to take on a 
greater role in this matter as issues of equality are too important to be left solely in the hands 
of business. 
